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Findings library
MajorChapter 1 15 Sept 2026

'Human error' accepted as a root cause, again

Investigation of anomalies: inadequate root cause analysis

What the inspector wrote

Deviation DEV-24-0187 concluded that the root cause was operator error and the CAPA was retraining of the operator concerned. The same failure mode had been recorded in three previous deviations in the preceding fourteen months, each with the same conclusion and the same corrective action. No assessment of contributing factors, procedure design or equipment had been performed.

Cited against EU GMP Chapter 1, 1.4(xiv); ICH Q10 3.2.2

Why it was cited

'Human error' describes what happened, not why it was possible. Inspectors treat it as a stopping point that the investigator chose rather than a conclusion the evidence forced. When the same error recurs with different people, the system, not the person, is the cause.

This is one of the most cited categories in EU and UK inspection deficiency data for a reason: it is easy to write, it closes the record quickly, and it prevents nothing.

What would have prevented it

  • Make 'human error' unacceptable as a final root cause without a documented contributing-factor analysis (procedure clarity, workload, equipment design, environment, training method).
  • Trend deviations by failure mode, not just by product, so the third occurrence is visible as a repeat.
  • Require CAPA effectiveness checks that measure recurrence, not completion of retraining.

Written from the deficiency categories published by EU and UK regulators. Details are illustrative and do not describe a specific named site.

More findings

MajorChapter 1 8 Sept 2026

The impact assessment that stopped at the batch

Deviation handling: impact on other batches not evaluated

A temperature excursion in cold store CS-02 was recorded as a deviation against batch 4471 only. Twelve other batches of four products were stored in CS-02 during the excursion window. No assessment of impact on these batches was performed and two of them were subsequently certified and distributed.

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MajorChapter 4 1 Sept 2026

Shared logins on a GMP system

Computerised systems: data integrity, access control

The chromatography data system in QC laboratory 2 was accessed using a shared account 'QCLAB' whose password was known to all analysts. Electronic signatures applied under this account could not be attributed to an individual. The audit trail showed 214 result approvals under the shared account in the review period.

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MajorChapter 1 25 Aug 2026

The change that went live before anyone approved it

Change control: change implemented prior to approval

Change control CC-24-031 to replace the filling machine PLC was raised on 14 March and approved on 2 April. Maintenance records show the PLC was replaced on 21 March and production resumed on 22 March. Three batches were manufactured on the modified equipment before the change control, including its validation impact assessment, was approved.

Read the breakdown